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Abstract
The 'Copenhagen Accord' fails to deliver the political framework for a fair, ambitious and legally-binding international 
climate agreement beyond 2012. The current climate policy regime dynamics are insufficient to reflect the realities of 
topical complexity, actor coalitions, as well as financial, legal and institutional challenges in the light of extreme time 
constraints to avoid 'dangerous' climate change of more than 2°C. In this paper we analyze these stumbling blocks for 
international climate policy and discuss alternatives in order to regain momentum for future negotiations.
Introduction
The last 20 years have witnessed increasing momentum
for international environmental policy efforts in order to
avoid 'dangerous' anthropogenic climate change. Major
achievements in the process so far have been the adop-
tion of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and the Kyoto Proto-
col (KP) in 1997, which entered into force in 2005. From
2005 onwards, Parties increasingly focused on the negoti-
a t i o n s  o f  t h e  g l o b a l  c l i m a t e  r e g i m e  b e y o n d  2 0 1 2 .  T h e
2007 Bali Action Plan kicked off the actual negotiations
on a post-2012 climate agreement, producing a compre-
hensive negotiations roadmap that was to lead the way to
the adoption of a new treaty at the climate conference in
Copenhagen in December 2009 [1]. After very limited
progress at a series of meetings prior to Copenhagen, the
initial ambitions for reaching a legally binding agreement
in Copenhagen had been reduced to the hope of reaching
political consensus on the key building blocks of the Bali
Action Plan. However, the summit largely failed to deliver
on this objective. Its main result, the 'Copenhagen
Accord' (CA) which had been negotiated by a group of
Parties led by the US and the largest emerging econo-
mies, did not gain the endorsement by the plenary of the
Conference of the Parties (COP), and was merely 'taken
n o t e  o f' .  A l l  i n  a l l ,  t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  a d v a n c e s  m a d e  b y
Copenhagen put the world on a trajectory beyond
2°warming by the end of this century.
At the same time, combating climate change has
become urgent. Global carbon dioxide emissions have
risen by approximately 41% since 1990 [2]. If 'dangerous'
climate change of more than 2°C is aimed to be prevented
with 67% probability, then global emissions should peak
between as early as 2015 and 2020. If the upper end of
this deadline is chosen, annual global emission reductions
have to amount to 9.0% from 2020 onwards. Since it
remains questionable whether societies are technologi-
cally and politically capable of achieving such rapid
reductions, the 2015 deadline requiring an annual emis-
sion reduction rate of 5.3%, while still very ambitious, is
probably more realistic [3]. Consequently, participation
in global mitigation efforts needs to be broadened, the
ambition of reduction targets and policies strengthened,
and necessary financing secured within the narrow time-
frame of five to ten years.
Even if sufficient emission reductions targets were
negotiated under a binding treaty in Mexico in December
2010, we still would have to be aware of the fact that
agreeing on a climate treaty is not equivalent to achieving
emission reductions. On the one hand, the time between
the negotiation of a treaty and its entry into force can
span several years as the experience of the KP taught us.
On the other hand, the translation of an international cli-
mate treaty into national law and finally into effective
national and local emission reduction measures might
also take several years. COP decisions could be translated
into domestic actions much faster than treaties, but they
have weaker legal status risking the domestic implemen-
tation. Research findings on the implementation of the
KP also reveal that climate mechanisms such as the Clean
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Development Mechanism (CDM) might only work
imperfectly and could need lengthy adjustment measures
[4].
International climate negotiations so far have been
based on the notion that a global challenge requires a
global solution, that the United Nations are the most suit-
able platform for universal action, and that with time it
will be possible to increase the ambition level and strin-
gency of the commitments, drawing in a growing number
of Parties [5]. This reflects the commonly held assump-
tion that multilateral environmental agreements typically
gradually evolve from loose political statements towards
an institutional framing of the problem and finally into
binding, enforceable agreements (e.g. [6]). This is
achieved by iteratively bringing a large amount of actors
together to steadily increase their commitment. Major
breakthroughs in such a process are often engineered in
arduous all-night negotiations, with the psychology of
political pressure as a key factor (e.g. [7]). Up to Copen-
hagen, the climate regime seemed a typical example of
this logic. However, the Copenhagen negotiations have
demonstrated the institutional, structural and strategic
limitations of the approach, when applied to a topic as
complex as climate change. In this paper, we first examine
key characteristics and controversies in international cli-
mate policy that help put the outcome of Copenhagen
int o cont e xt. In a sec ond st ep, we then point t o some
options and alternative approaches for regaining momen-
tum under the international climate regime.
Stumbling blocks in the climate negotiations to 
Copenhagen
Unfavorable institutional settings
United Nations processes, including the climate negotia-
tions, often follow the consensus principle. This ensures
maximum legitimacy and credibility among Parties. Yet
reaching agreement among 192 of them with fundamen-
tally different visions of the problem, its consequences
and the ways of resolving it severely limits prospects for
progress. Any outcome needs to take into account the
concerns even of the most unwilling country since it can-
not be overruled as in a major voting context. Conse-
quently, the UN procedures inherently tend to incentivize
extreme positions, slowing down the negotiation prog-
ress, while proactive forerunners tend to be disincentiv-
ized by lack of recognition. In Copenhagen the consensus
principle for COP decisions was (ab)-used various times
to suspend the COP for strategic purposes. Furthermore,
several countries took advantage of the system in order to
bargain for national interests in exchange for their
approval of the final decision. From a structural perspec-
tive it is thus questionable if the current format of the
UNFCCC conference is an appropriate venue for negoti-
ating meaningful climate agreements. With a view to
overcoming all these difficulties, during the opening ses-
sion of COP15, one party suggested the alternative of
two-thirds majority voting [8]. While this might theoreti-
cally be a sensible approach, it is practically unfeasible to
attain since the voting procedure under the UNFCCC can
only be changed by a consensus vote.
The way in which the Copenhagen Accord was eventu-
ally negotiated effectively shunned the elaborate UN rules
and procedures for decision-making. The twelve-para-
graph-long text, which hardly built on the two years of
arduous drafting work by UNFCCC working groups, was
the product of closed-door deliberations by a small group
of heads of states at the margins of the negotiations, led
by the US and the BASIC country group (Brazil, China,
India and South Africa). Their announcement to the
world public that a deal had been reached even preceded
its full discussion in the COP plenary. Not surprisingly,
very heated discussions ensued when the text was for-
mally introduced to the plenary. Ultimately, due to the
opposition of five countries, the Accord was not adopted,
but merely "noted" by the COP. Overall, these events have
created a general atmosphere of mistrust, which will
complicate future negotiations [9,10].
Climate change as a collective action problem
International climate policy is still trapped in a funda-
mental collective action dilemma. When labeling climate
protection as a global public good, then inaction on cli-
mate measures can be viewed as international prisoners'
dilemma. Climate policy can thus act as means of cooper-
ation in order to overcome this public good problem.
Still, countries might try not to cooperate by not signing
an international ambitious climate agreement. It would
allow them to share the benefits of climate protection,
while not bearing the costs of associated measures. Here,
non-cooperation does not only mean blocking such
agreement but also proposing emission reduction targets
(and financing provisions for developing countries),
which remain below their "global responsibility" (see
below). Disputes over non-cooperation due to insuffi-
cient emission limitation targets hampered the negotia-
tions in Copenhagen - most prominently between the US
and China. The US delegation was unwilling to increase
their offered target of 17% emission reduction compared
to 2005, since this would have threatened its later
approval by the US senate. The announced US target
itself was viewed insufficient by China, which in turn
rejected binding and ambitious targets for its economy.
The US senate and US congress in turn state that they will
only approve more ambitious targets, if economies in
transition such as China take up binding targets [11].
This vicious circle exists in various other constellations,
whereas it remains speculative if mistrust or the aim to
continue non-cooperation prevent consensus.Huettner et al. Carbon Balance and Management 2010, 5:2
http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/5/1/2
Page 3 of 8
Burden-sharing and a deepening North-South divide
The required levels of ambition under a new agreement
would clearly have to move beyond the 5.2% emission
reductions (compared to 1990) under the KP, which can
only be viewed as 'test-run' of an environmentally effec-
tive climate agreement. However, there is no point-land-
ing on a certain temperature target, but rather
probabilities. When a political decision on the accepted
probability has been made, then this provides informa-
tion on the global allowable atmospheric greenhouse gas
(GHG) concentration [3]. This concentration could then
be translated into the allowable global emission budget.
How this budget is finally divided among countries as
individual emission reduction targets is a highly contro-
versial political decision, since it implies major economic
restructuring towards low-carbon societies [12].
The science also makes clear that the challenge of
reducing emissions can no longer be viewed as the sole
responsibility of industrialized countries. Besides the
need for considerably more ambitious emission reduction
targets and financing commitments by industrialized
countries, deviations from the emission trajectories in
emerging economies are a sine qua non for avoiding 'dan-
gerous' climate change [13]. If there were any hopes that
the political divide between the North and the South has
narrowed since its first manifestation at the UN Confer-
ence on the Human Environment in 1972, the experience
of Copenhagen provided evidence to the contrary [9].
The rift was not only visible in the vehement opposition
of emerging economies to commit to binding emission
targets. The self-confident negotiation stance of develop-
ing countries on such issues as technology transfer, adap-
tation financing and reducing emissions from
deforestation, forest degradation and the enhancement of
carbon stocks (REDD+) underscored their recognition of
mutual dependence for reaching a post-2012 agreement.
At the same time, the repercussions of the financial crisis
hampered the willingness of industrialized countries to
provide funding in the magnitude envisaged by develop-
ing countries.
At the most basic level, reaching agreement in Copen-
hagen was complicated by very different views on the
notions of "equity" and "fairness" between North and
South [14]. Particularly the United States and Australia
stipulated that, based on their current share in global
emissions and future growth trends, emerging economies
should assume substantial commitments for cutting
emissions beyond 2012. The North thus followed a for-
ward-looking notion of equity and fairness, while devel-
oping countries reasoned from a largely historical
perspective, calling for emissions in the past 200 years to
be considered in distributing "allowed emission budgets".
Procedural and substantial complexity
Copenhagen certainly proved one of the most procedur-
ally and substantially complex negotiations in human his-
tory. Two years of work in numerous subgroups under
two different negotiation tracks had resulted in hundreds
of pages of heavily bracketed negotiation text on a large
number of often interdependent issues. Boiling this down
to a workable draft agreement proved an impossible chal-
lenge, both at the last meeting prior to Copenhagen and
at the summit itself [15]. Overall, the complexity of the
subject matter has clearly increased since the Kyoto con-
ference. In addition to the standing items on the
UNFCCC's agenda, a large number of new topics have
entered the negotiations agenda. REDD+, adaptation and
technology transfer financing, national appropriate miti-
gation actions (NAMAs), capacity building on measur-
ing, reporting and verifying emission reductions as well
as many other items needed to be integrated in the nego-
tiations with multiple interlinkages and dependencies
among the various agenda items. This setting included a
much broader array of heterogeneous stakeholders,
country circumstances and interests than ever before in
the history of the UNFCCC. The complexities and inter-
linkages blocked partial progress on individual negotia-
tion items and would only have been resolved in a final
package decision. Experienced delegates thus described
the latest climate negotiations as "too political for the
technicians and too technical for the politicians" [16].
Legal nature and architecture of a future agreement
The architecture and binding or non-binding nature of a
future climate agreement and whether to pursue the path
of the Kyoto Protocol, and to combine rules for industrial
countries with those for developing countries or not were
major issues of dissent in Copenhagen. The US position
not to join the KP in a second commitment period was
mainly related to concerns about remaining legal obliga-
tions under the KP and to domestic political constraints.
The EU pushed strongly for a single protocol approach, in
which the content of the 'Ad-hoc Working Group on
Long-term Cooperative Action' (AWG-LCA) and the 'Ad
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol' (AWG-KP)
would merge towards one legally binding protocol. Most
developing countries advocated non-binding regulations
for Non-Annex-1 countries and a legally binding future
KP. This would however bear the risk of endorsing double
standards for climate protection by potentially subjecting
Annex-1 countries to stricter rules under the KP [17].
Some developing countries, certainly the Alliance of
Small Island States (AOSIS), but also South Africa and
Brazil, supported a double protocol approach with aHuettner et al. Carbon Balance and Management 2010, 5:2
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legally binding outcome in the AWG-LCA. Yet this was
rejected by China and India since they feared moving
towards a binding emission reduction agreement. Devel-
oping countries largely rejected the EU proposal, since it
would abandon the existing Kyoto architecture and could
lead to lengthy re-negotiations on institutional settings
and rules [18].
Sources and management of climate financing
Another critical building block of the Bali Action Plan
addresses the financing of REDD+, adaptation, capacity
building and technology transfer in developing countries.
Industrial countries have generally accepted that they
bear the historical responsibility for anthropogenic cli-
mate change, and therefore have to deliver financial sup-
port. However, the magnitude of these payments, the
division of financing among donors, as well as the
requirements for managing the financial transfers
remains highly contentious. Between 2010 and 2050 the
costs of adapting to an approximately 2°C warmer world
by 2050 were estimated to range between USD 75 and
100 billion a year [19]. The CA's pledge to provide funds
approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010-2012, as
well as mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by
2020 is often perceived as the greatest success of COP 15.
But these funds should not only cover the costs of adapta-
tion, but also those of mitigation, technology transfer and
capacity building actions [20]. Hence, even assuming that
all funding under the CA would indeed be new and addi-
tional, it might only be sufficient to cover the impacts
resulting from 1.5°C of warming [21]. Article eight of the
CA states that "funding will come from a wide variety of
sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral,
including alternative sources of finance" [20]. This could
include tapping carbon markets through international
emission trading for mitigation actions in developing
countries. While carbon markets could indeed deliver a
portion of the needed funding, their unclear link with
emission reduction targets of donor countries after
Copenhagen poses the risk of lowering their ambitions
through offsetting (see e.g. [22]. The CA also established
a new Copenhagen Green Climate Fund. However, how
this instrument relates to the already existing funding
mechanisms under the Convention and the Protocol and
how it could be made operational given the lack of legal
status of the CA, remains to be seen [23].
Short-term incentives and notion of success
Whilst the CA demonstrates consensus about the
urgency of mitigation and the long-term 2°C goal, the
implications of this consensus at the level of decision
making - regional to national, immediate to decadal -
remain unclear. Without a clear vision about social wel-
fare benefits of mitigation actions there is no short-term
incentive to initiate mitigation actions. So far the scien-
tific consensus that some change in climate is unavoid-
able and hence societal change to adapt to it is inevitable
(see e.g. [24]) has not yet reached the spirit of the negoti-
ations. As long as success in Copenhagen is interpreted
by critical negotiators and interest groups as resistance to
change a consensus based negotiation process is prone to
fail to achieve the required momentum for adequate
ambition and timing of mitigation actions.
The CA itself did neither provide medium-term (2020)
nor long-term (2050) emission reduction targets. Coun-
tries were however encouraged to submit their pledges
on reducing their own GHG emissions until 2020 by 31st
January 2010. These pledges translate into emission
reductions of 11-19% (below 1990, excluding forestry and
land use change emissions) for industrialized countries
and roughly 5% -16% (below business as usual) for emerg-
ing economies and developing countries [25]. The deter-
mination of the latter emission reduction range should
however only be viewed as tentative, since the voluntary
targets of the major economies in transition China and
India refer to emission intensity targets. These pledges
would lead to approximately 2.9-3.9°C of temperature
increase by 2100 [26], which does not only contradict the
targeted temperature limit in the CA, but also threaten
the overall aim of the UNFCCC.
Ways forward
We hope to have shown that the current approach to
international climate policy looks insufficient to reach a
fair, ambitious and binding agreement and broad partici-
pation in the short time frame available. While some
hope that the upcoming climate conferences in Mexico
and in South Africa will eventually produce the long
awaited, ambitious post-2012 climate treaty, other
experts argue that the CA might well represent the high-
water mark of the climate change regime for some time to
come [18]. However, the urgency to increase efforts in
emissions abatement and adaptation financing prohibit a
further business-as-usual policy for the climate regime.
Having outlined some key factors that have obstructed
progress, in the following we present several suggestions
how to overcome the stumbling blocks for a post-2012
agreement in the light of the complex requirements and
conditions. We concentrate on the mentioned structural
shortcomings of negotiations under the UNFCCC as well
as the inability to adequately address the highly complex
negotiation agenda, taking account of the large number of
Parties involved. We also provide suggestions on how to
resolve issues of prevailing mistrust among Parties and
strategic bargaining on financing and mitigation burden
sharing in the light of the perceived fundamental collec-
tive action dilemma.Huettner et al. Carbon Balance and Management 2010, 5:2
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Building institutional complementary processes
The UNFCCC process alone will likely not be sufficient
to achieve swift progress on the long list of unresolved,
highly controversial negotiation issues. We do not argue
for an abolishment of the UNFCCC, but rather for the
necessity of complementary processes. The most conten-
tious issues in the negotiation arena are currently the
division of emission reduction burdens. Here, more
intense bilateral or small-n negotiations need to take
place. A positive example in this respect is the financial
consent on REDD payments by Norway, which gave Bra-
zil enough planning reliability to propose ambitious (yet
voluntary) targets in Copenhagen. Forums like the G20
and the Major Economies Meetings may likewise provide
a more focused setting for discussing mitigation in a
smaller group of key emitters, without being restricted by
the shortcomings and slow dynamics of the UN system.
Small-n negotiations can provide important impetus and
instill new dynamics into the UNFCCC process at large,
provided they do so in a transparent and inclusive man-
ner - this was clearly not the case for the CA which has
hammered out behind closed doors and then presented
to the rest of the 192 Parties as a fait accompli. The key
objective for Parties should be to use these other negotia-
tion venues to lock the advances made by the CA ( on
finance, but also on monitoring and reporting of nation-
ally appropriate mitigation actions) into the current UN
negotiations [27].
Finding consensus on equity, fairness and effectiveness
After the Copenhagen experience, rebuilding trust
between developing and developed nations is of utmost
priority for getting the climate negotiations back on
track. Developed countries acting on their promises on
finance through the swift operationalization and replen-
ishment of the promised funding mechanisms under the
CA using transparent, democratic, flexible and robust
rules, would provide a major step forward in this regard.
A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  t h e  C A  s h o u l d  b e  b r o u g h t  b a c k  a s
purely political agreement into the AWG process in order
to respect the work of all parties during the last years.
Otherwise, parallel agreements might emerge, which
would confuse the negotiation process.
Avoiding 'dangerous' climate change must remain the
overarching target for the UNFCCC process. Thus, there
is a need to re-establish the science basis of climate pol-
icy. Currently, proposed medium-term emission targets
until 2020 fall far short of the emissions abatement quan-
tities necessary for keeping the 2°C objective within
reach. We suggest re-negotiating emission reduction
pledges based on a global carbon budget approach [3] in
order to achieve coherence between politics and science.
This would require to limit global emissions to 44
GtCO2e by 2020 under the 2°C guardrail [28]. According
to the budget approach the remaining allowable carbon
emissions would be distributed globally based on the
principle of equal emission rights per capita. This could
prevent the mentioned vicious circle of lengthy bargain-
ing on individual country mitigation targets, while pro-
viding an acceptable approach of equity and fairness to
most Parties [29].
T h e  s e v e r e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  t h e  g l o b a l  c a r b o n  b u d g e t
also imply that loopholes such as the assigned amount
unit (AAU) surplus takeover from the first commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol need to be closed [30] There
are several solutions to this challenge such as restricting
the surplus towards domestic compliance in the coming
commitment periods, putting a discount on the traded
surplus credits, or buying those credits off the compli-
ance market. Obviously, the advantages for the environ-
ment and the market have to be balanced against the
political acceptability of the solution and the resulting
consequences for success on further rounds of negotia-
tion. Except for buying the surpluses, the other solutions
bear a tendency of punishment to the surplus holder.
International government-financed investment reserves
could purchase surplus credits and partially re-sell them
to smoothen short-term market imbalances and thus
close the mentioned loophole (see e.g. [31]).
Managing topical complexity
In order to speed up the progress on highly technical
issues, such as methodological questions on REDD+ and
the details of a global architecture for climate financing, a
permanent expert body operating under the Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA),
could provide for additional negotiation space (see e.g.
[31]). Different from several topics where progress is
largely determined by diplomatic bargaining during the
UNFCCC meetings, these technical questions often over-
burden the delegates in the limited time available. The
permanent expert body could consist of thematic experts
and negotiators representing certain country groups. Its
role would be to prepare COP decisions and to coordi-
nate the different country proposals on methodological
and technical aspects, which need in-depth analysis. Such
a body as well as small-n working groups linked to the
UNFCCC negotiations could quickly react to new emerg-
ing issues and provide the necessary flexibility to adapt to
the dynamic nature of the negotiation context.
Constructing a sound legal basis and protocol architecture
A single legal framework for a post-2012 regime has been
one of the negotiating priorities of the EU up until
Copenhagen. Yet given the vehement opposition of the
BASIC countries and the US to such an approach, it is
high time for the EU to rethink its position on this issue.
A two-protocol approach may well be the only achievableHuettner et al. Carbon Balance and Management 2010, 5:2
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compromise on legal form. Whereas binding emission
reduction targets would continue to apply to industrial-
ized countries under an updated Kyoto Protocol, a second
protocol could enshrine no-lose emission reduction tar-
gets for economies in transition and the US. Alternatively,
the second protocol could include dual intensity targets
that require countries to meet a "compliance" target, but
allow them to sell credits for emissions reductions above
a higher "selling" target [32]. Although both approaches
would endorse a substantial degree of inequality among
players, they might have the potential to overcome the
stumbling block in the negotiations. Asheim (2006) also
supports the idea of two separate climate agreements
being more effective than one single global agreement
from a game-theoretic perspective. As mentioned before,
the global budget approach offers an alternative to indi-
vidually negotiated targets due to equal per-capita emis-
sion allowances, which could nevertheless be defined as
national targets. As such, they do not only provide a fall-
back option to the above-mentioned strategies, but rather
the basis for target determination in line with the two-
protocol approach.
Enabling climate financing
One tangible outcome of the CA is the immediate estab-
lishment of a High Level Panel to study the contribution
of the potential sources of revenue, including alternative
sources of finance [20]. When submitting its final recom-
mendation immediately before the Cancun COP16 meet-
ing, providing feasible solutions for finance transfer
conditions, burden sharing and fast-start operationaliza-
tion should be high agenda items for this panel. The suc-
cess on these items will have important repercussions on
the trust-building process between developed and devel-
oping countries, which is a crucial pre-requisite for
advancing in a global climate deal [33]. Although the
magnitude of funding will need to be raised considerably
to cover the costs of climate change, the urgency of this
topic is probably relatively low. In the coming years it will
rather be a major challenge to guarantee the absorption
capacity for the provided funds given the still tentative
developments of many National Adaptation Programmes
of Action (NAPA), challenging governance situations and
capacity building needs to ensure international measure-
ment, reporting and verification requirements endorsed
under the CA. This challenge should not be overlooked,
especially since funding for adaptation under the CA will
be prioritized for states with rather low absorptive capac-
ity, such as least developed countries and small island
developing states.
Rethinking short-term incentive strategies
Economics and policy need to work closer together to
overcome the fundamental collective action dilemma of
international climate policy. We argue that recent
advances in game theory and innovation economics point
towards first-mover advantages for leaders in the climate
arena. Dynamic game theory models of coalition forma-
tion (perceiving international climate negotiations as a
sequential game framework) show that the prospect of
future renegotiations and the use of transfer schemes
(assume surplus sharing of the gains from cooperation
between coalition members) could result in low cost
abatement options and incentives to join an international
climate agreement at an early stage [34]. To assess the
possible benefits of cooperation it is however crucial to
increase the transparency and predictability in the nego-
tiations. Conditional emission reduction targets, such as
those proposed by the EU could be a feasible way for-
ward, but only if in combination with unconditional
lower target bounds.
Furthermore, the often perceived economic disadvan-
tages from ambitious emission reduction pledges mostly
rely on static and short-sighted economic considerations.
However , if taking into account perspectives of innova-
tion economics, cooperating on stringent climate policy
(or even moving forward unilaterally) can yield competi-
tive technical and economic advantages in the unavoid-
able path to low-carbon economies. Ambitious climate
regulations and investments in low carbon frontier tech-
nologies will unfold learning processes on research,
development and finally diffusion in highly competitive
international markets. These learning processes often
show path-dependency since a success-breeds-success
mechanism [35] provides a lasting lead of the early inno-
vators [36]. Even if they lag behind in efficiency early on,
the learning dynamics will ultimately lower the costs of
the necessary economic transitions and transform them
into an efficiency lead [37]. Hence, in the mid-term free-
riding by not investing in emission reduction technolo-
gies is counter-productive, since it delays investments in
technology to gain first-mover advantages for future mar-
kets such as renewable energy technologies [38].
Additionally, progressive countries in the international
climate negotiations will be able to take the lead in shap-
ing their future rules and mechanisms. This is in stark
contrast to the current negotiation attitude, where the
slowest and least constructive one is considered to win.
While this assumption might be valid in a short-term
perspective, the slowest one looses opportunity and
power to decide when change is unavoidable - both eco-
nomically and politically.
Leadership, credibility and communication are critical
for a successful management of change [39]. Indepen-
dently to any legal commitment, several US states and
many cities have set up emission ceilings and emission
trading systems. Economies in transition such as China,
India and Brazil have passed national laws to reduceHuettner et al. Carbon Balance and Management 2010, 5:2
http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/5/1/2
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emissions, have established national agencies to examine
the matter in more detail, and are raising public aware-
ness on climate change. These bottom-up initiatives need
to be more strongly visible in international negotiations
to demonstrate that mitigation is feasible and attractive.
Inspired by the "Fossil of the Day" award by non-govern-
mental organizations which rewards the key laggards and
footdraggers during the COPs, the UNFCCC Secretariat
or KP parties could turn this concept around and award
prizes to local forerunner actions, bottom-up networks
or even countries that show success in mitigation and
help improve the acceptance of mitigation actions.
Conclusions
The urgency to increase efforts in emissions abatement
and adaptation financing prohibit a further business-as-
usual in climate policy. The climate conference in Copen-
hagen did not succeed in removing the stumbling blocks
on the road towards a fair, ambitious and binding Post-
2012 agreement. In this paper we analyzed these chal-
lenges in order to discuss - without aiming to be exhaus-
tive - alternative solutions to regain momentum in
international climate politics.
Timely, fair and equitable solutions require more flexi-
bility in institutions and strategies, a sober analysis of the
scientific and political requirements, while simultane-
ously demanding more pragmatism and a culture of
cooperation. We hope to have shown that there are sev-
eral options and reasons to step off the beaten path in
international climate policy in order to tackle the men-
tioned challenges. Consequently, the complex dynamics
of negotiations will require all available efforts to regain
momentum for a Post-2012 agreement in the rapidly clos-
ing window of opportunity to avoid 'dangerous' climate
change.
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